

UK
TRADE &
INVESTMENT



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Transport Security
Strategic Management Issues –
Lessons from the UK Experience

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Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and the Christmas Day Attack: Why Aren't Lessons Learned?
December 2009

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'Police expect Mumbai-style attack on city'
Sunday Times, 20th December, 2009

December 2009

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Obama's Dilemma: Doing Good in a Complex World

June 2009

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Al Qaeda and Hamas in the Gaza Strip: Implications for Regional Security

August 2009

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日本インテリジェンス体制、
変革へのロードマップ

JAPAN

Japanese Intelligence System:
A Roadmap to Transformation



**A City Prepared:
An Overview of London's
Biological / Radiological
Counter-Terrorism Preparedness**

Confidential / Restricted

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**2010 Football Cup
Key Locations and Venues**

SOUTH AFRICA
Security Assessment and Recommendations

February 2010

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新しい日本の安全保障戦略
—多層協調的安全保障戦略—

JAPAN

Security Strategy



UK Emergency Management Expertise

- 30 years CT operations – IRA
- Senior police and administration experience
- National / Regional / Local frameworks

- London Resilience Coordination Committee
- Gold Commander Coordinating Committee
- Cabinet Office COBRA System

- 2012 LOCOG experience

- 7/7/2005 Lessons learnt

Traditional Security Management

1. Risk Assessment
2. Risk Control
3. Long-Term Management / Contingency Planning

Focussed on 'Response Programmes'

'New Generation' Security Management

1. Unpredicted events
2. Multi-agency response
3. High levels of complexity and inter-operability
4. Social impact
5. (National political significance)

Focussed on 'Response Capability'

Traditional Emergency / Crisis Management

1. Based on 'World War 3 scenarios'
2. Not relevant to modern-day 'emergency management'
3. Based on military-style command
 - Centrally controlled
 - Secretive
 - Restricted information – even between ministries
4. Massive-scale response – slow and hard to manage

Modern Emergency / Crisis Management

1. Based on 'Isolating Scenarios'
2. Allows other normal activities to continue
3. Based on police-style command
 - Locally controlled
 - Cooperative
 - Information-sharing
 - Public-facing (need to explain activities)
4. Small-scale response – fast and easy to manage

Large-Scale Incident Capability Development


- Strategic Coordinating Body (Ultra-Gold)
- Regular Exercises (One is not enough!)
- Personal Contacts
- Strategic Command Capability – not single agency (police, fire service, ambulance, etc)
- Political – Strategic – Operational networks
- Fast Response – Flexibility – Multi-Agency Capability



London Bombers – July 2005



1. 08.51 Explosion in tunnel between Aldgate and Liverpool Street (7 dead)
2. 08.56 Explosion in tunnel between Kings Cross and Russel Square (21 dead)
3. 09.17 Explosion close to Edgware Road station (7 dead)
4. 09.47 Bus explosion at Tavistock Square (13 dead)





Immediate Response

- Although this was clearly a 'Terrorist Incident', and probably Islamic-connected, it was treated as a 'normal' criminal incident
- Police were in charge, and established a criminal investigation
- Normal life could go on
- Following day, most trains and buses running normally
- By Day 3, full service resumed (except for actual attack sites)

Strong Points

- There had been a series of exercises over the previous years
- All Gold Commanders from the different services knew each other and had worked together on the exercises
- Previous exercises had included dealing with a complete power failure across London, another with a mass public health problem

Weak Points

- Response to first incident was effective
- Response to later incidents increasingly chaotic
- Training exercises run for isolated and controlled incidents
- Main problems came from lack of extra level of 'Gold Command Coordination'

Central Command and Control – 'Ultra-Gold'

- Absolutely vital to have Unified C&C Centre
- Otherwise, each service will make own decisions, leading to chaos , confusion, and breakdown in response capability
- Objective is to have a single, unified, coordinated operation, rather than separate operations run by separate agencies

Gold Commander → Emergency Manager

- National Emergency Planning College (1989)
- Cross-agency staff exchanges
- Development of strategic perspective
- Responding to 'Emergencies / Disasters', not just terrorism
- If terrorist incident occurs, already well-practiced in multi-agency response

Response Coordination

- COBRA
(Cabinet Office
Emergency Management
Committee) National / Political Coordination
- Gold Co-ordinating Group
(GCG) Multi-Agency Operational
Coordination
- London Resilience
Coordination Committee London administration and
other civil agency
coordination

Gold Co-ordinating Group (GCG) located within Strategic Co-ordinating Centre (SCC)



COBR
(Cabinet Office
Coordinating Committee)

Metropolitan Police Service
City of London Police
British Transport Police
MOD Police

Media Group

HQ London District
(Joint Regional
Liaison officer)

London Local
Authorities Gold,
Local Authorities
Chief Executives

Media

Police

Chair GCG
(Police)

Govt
Liaison Officer

London
Fire Brigade

Military

Gold Coordinating Group (GCG)

Local
Authorities

Fire

Utilities

Ambulance

Transco
National Grid
Thames Water
British Telecom

Transport

Public
Health Adviser

Health

London
Ambulance Service

London Underground
Transport for London
Network Rail
Port of London Authority
British Airports Authority
National Air Traffic Service

Health Advice

London Strategic
Health Authority

Communications - Tactical

- No communications between train drivers and surface
- No communications between passengers and trains
- No communication between emergency services and surface
- No communication between London Underground emergency responders and surface
- This problem had been identified following Kings Cross Underground Fire (1987, 31 dead)

Communications - Operational

- Incident managers were not comfortable using 2-way radios
- Did not know what channel to use
- No coordination
- Mainly used mobile phones – but that was affected by massive stress on the whole mobile phone systems

Communication - Technology

- Gold Command Coordinating Committee had option to close down entire mobile phone system
- Then use special equipment that would allow them to have exclusive use of the networks
- Adapted handsets had not been distributed to the responsible people, so this option was actually not viable

Flexibility

Adapt the plan to fit the situation

Do Not

Adapt the situation to fit the plan!


Emergency Incident Control Room

- There was a part of the pre-prepared Emergency Management Plan that called for the Emergency Command Centre to be moved out of London to a specialist Emergency Incident Control Room
- This was initially activated, even though it soon became clear that it was not necessary, and that actually the chaos in London meant that it was impossible to move the necessary personnel to the new site

Operation / People Focused

- The whole response was 'Operation Focused'
- No clear plan what to do with survivors
- No coordinated meet / greet for people leaving the stations
- No record of who was injured, who was treated

Zones & Cordons



Survivor Reception Area

- Someone needs to be responsible!
- Assess, Record, Respond
- Inner & Outer Cordons will be chaotic
- **Need to have near-by hotel, department store, major businesses, etc**

7/7 Incident: July, warm day, nice weather

Sochi: 7/2 – 16/03 Could be cold, wet, snow...


Media Management

- The media is the way the public is going to follow the incident
- Vital to have an operational media control centre
- Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair gave the original press conference at 11.00, 2 hours after the attack
- Emphasised that situation was under control , the country and citizens were safe


- Sir Ian Blair's presence added authority to the announcement, **BUT**
- Later announcements by more junior officers not taken as seriously

Media Management - Lessons


- Have regular media sessions (eg every two hours), even when nothing to report
- Otherwise, media will continue reporting old clips, even when no longer appropriate
- Make all announcements through the official police spokesman – other spokesmen do not have same level of authority or respect
- Make sure that official announcements are not in opposition to what media knows from their own sources



http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/corp/assets/publications/reports/intelligence/isc_7july_report.pdf



http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/210852/20090519_77review.pdf




<http://terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/London-July-7-2005-Transit-Bombing-Report.pdf>



30/03/20

<http://terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/Looking-Back-Moving-Forward-London-Bombings.pdf>



Presentation title

31

Basic Points

- All Gold Commanders should know each other
- Do not trust new technology
- Create frameworks – not detailed plans
- Practice, Practice, Practice!

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